ICUICU
critical

@zereight/mcp-gitlab

v2.0.30

MCP server for using the GitLab API

npmGitHub ActionsFirst seen Feb 22, 2026

459

Total

70

Critical

230

High

159

Medium

Findings

unknown
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    8: const GITLAB_API_URL = process.env.GITLAB_API_URL || "https://gitlab.com";
    9: const GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN = process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN || "";
>>> 10: const PROJECT_ID = process.env.PROJECT_ID || "your/project";
    11: const ISSUE_IID = Number(process.env.ISSUE_IID || "1");
    12: async function testCreateIssueNote() {
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    9: const GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN = process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN || "";
    10: const PROJECT_ID = process.env.PROJECT_ID || "your/project";
>>> 11: const ISSUE_IID = Number(process.env.ISSUE_IID || "1");
    12: async function testCreateIssueNote() {
    13:     try {
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3: const DEFAULT_NULL = process.env.DEFAULT_NULL === "true";
    4: const logger = pino({
>>> 5:     level: process.env.LOG_LEVEL || 'info',
    6:     transport: {
    7:         target: 'pino-pretty',
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    6: import fetch from "node-fetch";
    7: // GitLab API configuration (replace with actual values when testing)
>>> 8: const GITLAB_API_URL = process.env.GITLAB_API_URL || "https://gitlab.com";
    9: const GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN = process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN || "";
    10: const PROJECT_ID = process.env.PROJECT_ID || "your/project";
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    7: // GitLab API configuration (replace with actual values when testing)
    8: const GITLAB_API_URL = process.env.GITLAB_API_URL || "https://gitlab.com";
>>> 9: const GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN = process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN || "";
    10: const PROJECT_ID = process.env.PROJECT_ID || "your/project";
    11: const ISSUE_IID = Number(process.env.ISSUE_IID || "1");
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    8: const GITLAB_API_URL = process.env.GITLAB_API_URL || "https://gitlab.com";
    9: const GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN = process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN || "";
>>> 10: const PROJECT_ID = process.env.PROJECT_ID || "your/project";
    11: const ISSUE_IID = Number(process.env.ISSUE_IID || "1");
    12: const DISCUSSION_ID = process.env.DISCUSSION_ID || "your-discussion-id";
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    9: const GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN = process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN || "";
    10: const PROJECT_ID = process.env.PROJECT_ID || "your/project";
>>> 11: const ISSUE_IID = Number(process.env.ISSUE_IID || "1");
    12: const DISCUSSION_ID = process.env.DISCUSSION_ID || "your-discussion-id";
    13: const NOTE_ID = process.env.NOTE_ID || "your-note-id";
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    10: const PROJECT_ID = process.env.PROJECT_ID || "your/project";
    11: const ISSUE_IID = Number(process.env.ISSUE_IID || "1");
>>> 12: const DISCUSSION_ID = process.env.DISCUSSION_ID || "your-discussion-id";
    13: const NOTE_ID = process.env.NOTE_ID || "your-note-id";
    14: /**
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    11: const ISSUE_IID = Number(process.env.ISSUE_IID || "1");
    12: const DISCUSSION_ID = process.env.DISCUSSION_ID || "your-discussion-id";
>>> 13: const NOTE_ID = process.env.NOTE_ID || "your-note-id";
    14: /**
    15:  * Test resolving an issue note
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    23:             // Prepare environment variables for the server process
    24:             const serverEnv = {};
>>> 25:             // Copy process.env, filtering out undefined values
    26:             for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(process.env)) {
    27:                 if (value !== undefined) {
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    24:             const serverEnv = {};
    25:             // Copy process.env, filtering out undefined values
>>> 26:             for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(process.env)) {
    27:                 if (value !== undefined) {
    28:                     serverEnv[key] = value;
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    33:     }
    34:     const serverEnv = {
>>> 35:         ...process.env,
    36:         ...env,
    37:     };
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    7: const MOCK_TOKEN_HEADER = 'glpat-mock-token-header';
    8: describe('Dynamic Routing and Authentication Scenarios', () => {
>>> 9:     const originalToken = process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN_TEST;
    10:     before(() => {
    11:         process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN_TEST = 'mock-token-for-launcher';
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    9:     const originalToken = process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN_TEST;
    10:     before(() => {
>>> 11:         process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN_TEST = 'mock-token-for-launcher';
    12:     });
    13:     after(() => {
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    13:     after(() => {
    14:         if (originalToken) {
>>> 15:             process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN_TEST = originalToken;
    16:         }
    17:         else {
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    16:         }
    17:         else {
>>> 18:             delete process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN_TEST;
    19:         }
    20:     });
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    24:         let mcpUrl;
    25:         let mockServer;
>>> 26:         const originalProjectId = process.env.TEST_PROJECT_ID;
    27:         before(async () => {
    28:             // Ensure GITLAB_TOKEN_TEST matches what we expect for this scenario
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    28:             // Ensure GITLAB_TOKEN_TEST matches what we expect for this scenario
    29:             // to avoid launchServer overwriting GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN with a different value
>>> 30:             process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN_TEST = MOCK_TOKEN_DEFAULT;
    31:             process.env.TEST_PROJECT_ID = '1';
    32:             const mockPort = await findMockServerPort(9021);
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    29:             // to avoid launchServer overwriting GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN with a different value
    30:             process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN_TEST = MOCK_TOKEN_DEFAULT;
>>> 31:             process.env.TEST_PROJECT_ID = '1';
    32:             const mockPort = await findMockServerPort(9021);
    33:             mockServer = new MockGitLabServer({ port: mockPort, validTokens: [MOCK_TOKEN_DEFAULT] });
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    49:         after(async () => {
    50:             if (originalProjectId) {
>>> 51:                 process.env.TEST_PROJECT_ID = originalProjectId;
    52:             }
    53:             else {
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    52:             }
    53:             else {
>>> 54:                 delete process.env.TEST_PROJECT_ID;
    55:             }
    56:             if (mcpServer)
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    10: import { GitLabOAuth } from '../oauth.js';
    11: // Test configuration
>>> 12: const TEST_CLIENT_ID = process.env.GITLAB_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID || 'test-client-id';
    13: const TEST_REDIRECT_URI = process.env.GITLAB_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI || 'http://127.0.0.1:8888/callback';
    14: const TEST_GITLAB_URL = process.env.GITLAB_API_URL?.replace('/api/v4', '') || 'https://gitlab.com';
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    11: // Test configuration
    12: const TEST_CLIENT_ID = process.env.GITLAB_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID || 'test-client-id';
>>> 13: const TEST_REDIRECT_URI = process.env.GITLAB_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI || 'http://127.0.0.1:8888/callback';
    14: const TEST_GITLAB_URL = process.env.GITLAB_API_URL?.replace('/api/v4', '') || 'https://gitlab.com';
    15: const TEST_TOKEN_PATH = path.join(process.cwd(), '.test-gitlab-token.json');
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    12: const TEST_CLIENT_ID = process.env.GITLAB_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID || 'test-client-id';
    13: const TEST_REDIRECT_URI = process.env.GITLAB_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI || 'http://127.0.0.1:8888/callback';
>>> 14: const TEST_GITLAB_URL = process.env.GITLAB_API_URL?.replace('/api/v4', '') || 'https://gitlab.com';
    15: const TEST_TOKEN_PATH = path.join(process.cwd(), '.test-gitlab-token.json');
    16: const testResults = [];
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    258: // Test 14: Environment variable configuration
    259: async function testEnvironmentVariableConfig() {
>>> 260:     const clientId = process.env.GITLAB_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID;
    261:     const redirectUri = process.env.GITLAB_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI || 'http://127.0.0.1:8888/callback';
    262:     assert(typeof clientId === 'string' || clientId === undefined, 'Client ID should be string or undefined');
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    259: async function testEnvironmentVariableConfig() {
    260:     const clientId = process.env.GITLAB_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID;
>>> 261:     const redirectUri = process.env.GITLAB_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI || 'http://127.0.0.1:8888/callback';
    262:     assert(typeof clientId === 'string' || clientId === undefined, 'Client ID should be string or undefined');
    263:     assert(typeof redirectUri === 'string', 'Redirect URI should be string');
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    16: }
    17: function getConfig(cliKey, envKey, defaultValue) {
>>> 18:     return cliArgs[cliKey] || process.env[envKey] || defaultValue;
    19: }
    20: import { Server } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/index.js";
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    55: import { pino } from "pino";
    56: const logger = pino({
>>> 57:     level: process.env.LOG_LEVEL || "info",
    58:     transport: {
    59:         target: "pino-pretty",
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    176:     const errors = [];
    177:     // Validate SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
>>> 178:     const timeoutStr = process.env.SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECONDS;
    179:     if (timeoutStr) {
    180:         const timeout = Number.parseInt(timeoutStr, 10);
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    10: console.log('');
    11: // Configuration check
>>> 12: const GITLAB_API_URL = process.env.GITLAB_API_URL || "https://gitlab.com";
    13: const GITLAB_TOKEN = process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN_TEST || process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN;
    14: const TEST_PROJECT_ID = process.env.TEST_PROJECT_ID;
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    11: // Configuration check
    12: const GITLAB_API_URL = process.env.GITLAB_API_URL || "https://gitlab.com";
>>> 13: const GITLAB_TOKEN = process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN_TEST || process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN;
    14: const TEST_PROJECT_ID = process.env.TEST_PROJECT_ID;
    15: console.log('🔧 Test Configuration:');
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    12: const GITLAB_API_URL = process.env.GITLAB_API_URL || "https://gitlab.com";
    13: const GITLAB_TOKEN = process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN_TEST || process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN;
>>> 14: const TEST_PROJECT_ID = process.env.TEST_PROJECT_ID;
    15: console.log('🔧 Test Configuration:');
    16: console.log(`  GitLab URL: ${GITLAB_API_URL}`);
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    13: console.log('');
    14: // Configuration check
>>> 15: const GITLAB_API_URL = process.env.GITLAB_API_URL || "https://gitlab.com";
    16: const GITLAB_TOKEN = process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN_TEST || process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN;
    17: const TEST_PROJECT_ID = process.env.TEST_PROJECT_ID;
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    14: // Configuration check
    15: const GITLAB_API_URL = process.env.GITLAB_API_URL || "https://gitlab.com";
>>> 16: const GITLAB_TOKEN = process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN_TEST || process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN;
    17: const TEST_PROJECT_ID = process.env.TEST_PROJECT_ID;
    18: console.log('🔧 Test Configuration:');
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    15: const GITLAB_API_URL = process.env.GITLAB_API_URL || "https://gitlab.com";
    16: const GITLAB_TOKEN = process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN_TEST || process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN;
>>> 17: const TEST_PROJECT_ID = process.env.TEST_PROJECT_ID;
    18: console.log('🔧 Test Configuration:');
    19: console.log(`  GitLab URL: ${GITLAB_API_URL}`);
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    188:     }
    189:     // Validate MAX_SESSIONS
>>> 190:     const maxSessionsStr = process.env.MAX_SESSIONS;
    191:     if (maxSessionsStr) {
    192:         const maxSessions = Number.parseInt(maxSessionsStr, 10);
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    196:     }
    197:     // Validate MAX_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE
>>> 198:     const maxReqStr = process.env.MAX_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE;
    199:     if (maxReqStr) {
    200:         const maxReq = Number.parseInt(maxReqStr, 10);
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    1465:     .map(normalizeGitLabApiUrl);
    1466: const GITLAB_API_URL = GITLAB_API_URLS[0];
>>> 1467: const GITLAB_PROJECT_ID = process.env.GITLAB_PROJECT_ID;
    1468: const GITLAB_ALLOWED_PROJECT_IDS = process.env.GITLAB_ALLOWED_PROJECT_IDS?.split(",")
    1469:     .map(id => id.trim())
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    1466: const GITLAB_API_URL = GITLAB_API_URLS[0];
    1467: const GITLAB_PROJECT_ID = process.env.GITLAB_PROJECT_ID;
>>> 1468: const GITLAB_ALLOWED_PROJECT_IDS = process.env.GITLAB_ALLOWED_PROJECT_IDS?.split(",")
    1469:     .map(id => id.trim())
    1470:     .filter(Boolean) || [];
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    19:         const proc = spawn('node', ['build/index.js'], {
    20:             stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
>>> 21:             env: { ...process.env, ...env, GITLAB_READ_ONLY_MODE: 'true' },
    22:         });
    23:         const timer = setTimeout(() => {
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    11:             stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
    12:             env: {
>>> 13:                 ...process.env,
    14:                 ...env,
    15:                 GITLAB_READ_ONLY_MODE: 'true'
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    12:             env: {
    13:                 ...process.env,
>>> 14:                 ...env,
    15:                 GITLAB_READ_ONLY_MODE: 'true'
    16:             }
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    34:             stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
    35:             env: {
>>> 36:                 ...process.env,
    37:                 ...env,
    38:                 GITLAB_READ_ONLY_MODE: 'true'
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    35:             env: {
    36:                 ...process.env,
>>> 37:                 ...env,
    38:                 GITLAB_READ_ONLY_MODE: 'true'
    39:             }
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    13: const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
    14: const __dirname = path.dirname(__filename);
>>> 15: const GITLAB_TOKEN = process.env.GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN || process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN;
    16: const GITLAB_PROJECT_ID = process.env.GITLAB_PROJECT_ID;
    17: const GITLAB_API_URL = process.env.GITLAB_API_URL || "https://gitlab.com/api/v4";
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    14: const __dirname = path.dirname(__filename);
    15: const GITLAB_TOKEN = process.env.GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN || process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN;
>>> 16: const GITLAB_PROJECT_ID = process.env.GITLAB_PROJECT_ID;
    17: const GITLAB_API_URL = process.env.GITLAB_API_URL || "https://gitlab.com/api/v4";
    18: const MERGE_REQUEST_IID = process.env.MERGE_REQUEST_IID;
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    15: const GITLAB_TOKEN = process.env.GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN || process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN;
    16: const GITLAB_PROJECT_ID = process.env.GITLAB_PROJECT_ID;
>>> 17: const GITLAB_API_URL = process.env.GITLAB_API_URL || "https://gitlab.com/api/v4";
    18: const MERGE_REQUEST_IID = process.env.MERGE_REQUEST_IID;
    19: async function sendMcpRequest(serverProcess, method, params) {
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    16: const GITLAB_PROJECT_ID = process.env.GITLAB_PROJECT_ID;
    17: const GITLAB_API_URL = process.env.GITLAB_API_URL || "https://gitlab.com/api/v4";
>>> 18: const MERGE_REQUEST_IID = process.env.MERGE_REQUEST_IID;
    19: async function sendMcpRequest(serverProcess, method, params) {
    20:     return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    68:     const serverProcess = spawn("node", [serverPath], {
    69:         env: {
>>> 70:             ...process.env,
    71:             GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN: GITLAB_TOKEN,
    72:             GITLAB_API_URL,
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    4460:                 const idx = restPath.lastIndexOf("/api/v4");
    4461:                 const prefix = idx >= 0 ? restPath.slice(0, idx) : "";
>>> 4462:                 const graphqlUrl = process.env.GITLAB_GRAPHQL_URL || `${apiUrl.origin}${prefix}/api/graphql`;
    4463:                 // Add timeout to avoid hanging requests
    4464:                 const controller = new AbortController();
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    12:             stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
    13:             env: {
>>> 14:                 ...process.env,
    15:                 ...env,
    16:                 GITLAB_READ_ONLY_MODE: 'true'
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    13:             env: {
    14:                 ...process.env,
>>> 15:                 ...env,
    16:                 GITLAB_READ_ONLY_MODE: 'true'
    17:             }
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    5608:     const authTimeouts = {};
    5609:     // Configuration and limits
>>> 5610:     const MAX_SESSIONS = Number.parseInt(process.env.MAX_SESSIONS || "1000", 10);
    5611:     const MAX_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE = Number.parseInt(process.env.MAX_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE || "60", 10);
    5612:     // Metrics tracking
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    5: import { spawn } from 'child_process';
    6: import * as path from 'path';
>>> 7: export const HOST = process.env.HOST || '127.0.0.1';
    8: export var TransportMode;
    9: (function (TransportMode) {
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    20:     // Prepare environment variables based on transport mode
    21:     // Use same configuration pattern as existing validate-api.js
>>> 22:     const GITLAB_API_URL = process.env.GITLAB_API_URL || "https://gitlab.com";
    23:     const GITLAB_TOKEN = process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN_TEST || process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN;
    24:     const TEST_PROJECT_ID = process.env.TEST_PROJECT_ID;
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    21:     // Use same configuration pattern as existing validate-api.js
    22:     const GITLAB_API_URL = process.env.GITLAB_API_URL || "https://gitlab.com";
>>> 23:     const GITLAB_TOKEN = process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN_TEST || process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN;
    24:     const TEST_PROJECT_ID = process.env.TEST_PROJECT_ID;
    25:     // Check if remote authorization is enabled
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    22:     const GITLAB_API_URL = process.env.GITLAB_API_URL || "https://gitlab.com";
    23:     const GITLAB_TOKEN = process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN_TEST || process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN;
>>> 24:     const TEST_PROJECT_ID = process.env.TEST_PROJECT_ID;
    25:     // Check if remote authorization is enabled
    26:     const isRemoteAuth = env.REMOTE_AUTHORIZATION === 'true';
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    34:     const serverEnv = {
    35:         ...process.env,
>>> 36:         ...env,
    37:     };
    38:     // Only set GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN if not using remote auth
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    5609:     // Configuration and limits
    5610:     const MAX_SESSIONS = Number.parseInt(process.env.MAX_SESSIONS || "1000", 10);
>>> 5611:     const MAX_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE = Number.parseInt(process.env.MAX_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE || "60", 10);
    5612:     // Metrics tracking
    5613:     const metrics = {
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    1469:     .map(id => id.trim())
    1470:     .filter(Boolean) || [];
>>> 1471: const GITLAB_COMMIT_FILES_PER_PAGE = process.env.GITLAB_COMMIT_FILES_PER_PAGE
    1472:     ? Number.parseInt(process.env.GITLAB_COMMIT_FILES_PER_PAGE, 10)
    1473:     : 20;
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    1470:     .filter(Boolean) || [];
    1471: const GITLAB_COMMIT_FILES_PER_PAGE = process.env.GITLAB_COMMIT_FILES_PER_PAGE
>>> 1472:     ? Number.parseInt(process.env.GITLAB_COMMIT_FILES_PER_PAGE, 10)
    1473:     : 20;
    1474: // Validate authentication configuration
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    9: const logger = pino({
    10:     name: "gitlab-mcp-oauth",
>>> 11:     level: process.env.LOG_LEVEL || "info",
    12: });
    13: // Track pending auth requests across multiple MCP instances
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    83:         this.config = config;
    84:         this.tokenStoragePath =
>>> 85:             config.tokenStoragePath || path.join(process.env.HOME || "", ".gitlab-mcp-token.json");
    86:     }
    87:     /**
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    509:  */
    510: export async function initializeOAuth(gitlabUrl = "https://gitlab.com") {
>>> 511:     const clientId = process.env.GITLAB_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID;
    512:     const clientSecret = process.env.GITLAB_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET;
    513:     const redirectUri = process.env.GITLAB_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI || "http://127.0.0.1:8888/callback";
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    510: export async function initializeOAuth(gitlabUrl = "https://gitlab.com") {
    511:     const clientId = process.env.GITLAB_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID;
>>> 512:     const clientSecret = process.env.GITLAB_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET;
    513:     const redirectUri = process.env.GITLAB_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI || "http://127.0.0.1:8888/callback";
    514:     const tokenStoragePath = process.env.GITLAB_OAUTH_TOKEN_PATH;
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    511:     const clientId = process.env.GITLAB_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID;
    512:     const clientSecret = process.env.GITLAB_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET;
>>> 513:     const redirectUri = process.env.GITLAB_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI || "http://127.0.0.1:8888/callback";
    514:     const tokenStoragePath = process.env.GITLAB_OAUTH_TOKEN_PATH;
    515:     if (!clientId) {
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    512:     const clientSecret = process.env.GITLAB_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET;
    513:     const redirectUri = process.env.GITLAB_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI || "http://127.0.0.1:8888/callback";
>>> 514:     const tokenStoragePath = process.env.GITLAB_OAUTH_TOKEN_PATH;
    515:     if (!clientId) {
    516:         throw new Error("GITLAB_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID environment variable is required for OAuth authentication");
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    1: import { z } from "zod";
    2: import { pino } from 'pino';
>>> 3: const DEFAULT_NULL = process.env.DEFAULT_NULL === "true";
    4: const logger = pino({
    5:     level: process.env.LOG_LEVEL || 'info',
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    6: import fetch from "node-fetch";
    7: // GitLab API configuration (replace with actual values when testing)
>>> 8: const GITLAB_API_URL = process.env.GITLAB_API_URL || "https://gitlab.com";
    9: const GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN = process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN || "";
    10: const PROJECT_ID = process.env.PROJECT_ID || "your/project";
Report false positive
criticalDE-002Data ExfiltrationHigh ConfidenceLine 0

Environment file access

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DE-002) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    7: // GitLab API configuration (replace with actual values when testing)
    8: const GITLAB_API_URL = process.env.GITLAB_API_URL || "https://gitlab.com";
>>> 9: const GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN = process.env.GITLAB_TOKEN || "";
    10: const PROJECT_ID = process.env.PROJECT_ID || "your/project";
    11: const ISSUE_IID = Number(process.env.ISSUE_IID || "1");
Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �^����z����h�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��Lz�E�z�M�׬

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: R�Z����z����h�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��Lz�E�z�C���

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �+-1��y���-U�슉�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �Lz�E�z�Uz�"�t���

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: R�Z����z���Ԝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��Lz�E�z�@��轩R��^

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: .+-5�����zĜ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: .+->�#y�LzfޮĜ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: .+-����-zĜ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: r������z������

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: .+-"�.x���Ĝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �+-"�.x8�r�,���

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ���墒#ځ䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: R�Z�墒#ځ䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �^�墒#ځ䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��O����w�������

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ������b�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��zS��b�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �����7��ȥz�h�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: yح>�#y�L�W����

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �^���7��ȥz�h�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �L�W����"�.zĜ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �L�W������v�'���Ĝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: 1��v�'R�hiԜ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �'����Zr��Ԝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: v�'���E�^jǀ�ǭ

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: J�b�'���ӭ�즊�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ���jf����j{)��l

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��,���z����{l

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��,���z����{l

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��,���z����{l

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ���jf����j{)��l

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ���rם ���"�/�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ���jf����j{)��l

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ���jf����j{)��l

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �{�Ȩ�)�&��7�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ���jf����j{)��l

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ���jf����j{)��l

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ���jf����j{)��l

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��,���z����{l

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ���jf����j{)��l

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��Qz����z�"��^

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ���jf����j{)��l

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ���jf����j{)��l

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ���jf����j{)��l

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��,���z����{l

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ���jf����j{)��l

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ���jf����j{)��l

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��,���z����{l

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: {!jx �^�ӢG�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��z�Hu:�a"{-jw

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��z�Hu:�a"{-jw

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��z�Hu:�a"{-jw

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��z�Hu:�a"{-jw

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: {!jx �^�ӢG�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��z�Hu:�a"{-jw

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��-E�(����˞6�^

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��-E�(����˞6�^

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: J�b�)bz{S��즊�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: J�b�)bz{S��즊�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��-N��+h��=�a

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��-�jX�N����G�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��-�jX�N��Li���

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��-N��X�x���+,���

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��->�������+r

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��(����b�ק��b��-���

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��-N��+h��=�a

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��-�jX�N����G�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��-�jX�N��Li���

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��-N��X�x���+,���

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��->�������+r

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: J��jf����L�޲Х���

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: J��jf����L�޲Х���

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highSC-005Suspicious CommandsMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Node.js child process spawning

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule SC-005) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    1: import { describe, test, before, after } from 'node:test';
    2: import assert from 'node:assert';
>>> 3: import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
    4: import fs from 'node:fs';
    5: import { MockGitLabServer, findMockServerPort } from './utils/mock-gitlab-server.js';
Report false positive
highSC-005Suspicious CommandsMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Node.js child process spawning

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule SC-005) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    1: import { describe, test, before, after } from 'node:test';
    2: import assert from 'node:assert';
>>> 3: import { spawn } from 'child_process';
    4: import { MockGitLabServer, findMockServerPort } from './utils/mock-gitlab-server.js';
    5: const MOCK_TOKEN = 'glpat-mock-token-12345';
Report false positive
highSC-005Suspicious CommandsMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Node.js child process spawning

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule SC-005) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    1: import { describe, test, before, after, beforeEach } from 'node:test';
    2: import assert from 'node:assert';
>>> 3: import { spawn } from 'child_process';
    4: import { MockGitLabServer, findMockServerPort } from './utils/mock-gitlab-server.js';
    5: const MOCK_TOKEN = 'glpat-mock-token-12345';
Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �x^�+^tIݦ���x�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �x^�+^tIݦ���x�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �x^�+^tIݦ���x�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �x^�+^tIݦ���x�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �x^�+^tIݦ���x�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highSC-005Suspicious CommandsMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Node.js child process spawning

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule SC-005) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    8:  * Optional: Set MERGE_REQUEST_IID to test a specific merge request
    9:  */
>>> 10: import { spawn } from "child_process";
    11: import path from "path";
    12: import { fileURLToPath } from "url";
Report false positive
highSC-005Suspicious CommandsMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Node.js child process spawning

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule SC-005) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    1: import { describe, test, before, after } from 'node:test';
    2: import assert from 'node:assert';
>>> 3: import { spawn } from 'child_process';
    4: import { MockGitLabServer, findMockServerPort } from './utils/mock-gitlab-server.js';
    5: const MOCK_TOKEN = 'glpat-mock-token-12345';
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highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: q�e�Lz�E�z�C���

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

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highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: q�e�Lz�E�z�C���

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: q�e�Lz�E�z�C���

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

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highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: q�e�Lz�E�z�C���

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: q�e�Lz�E�z�C���

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highSC-005Suspicious CommandsMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Node.js child process spawning

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule SC-005) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3:  * Manages server processes and provides clean shutdown
    4:  */
>>> 5: import { spawn } from 'child_process';
    6: import * as path from 'path';
    7: export const HOST = process.env.HOST || '127.0.0.1';
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highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: J�b�'���ӭ�즊�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

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highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��zS��b�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

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highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ������z����h�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ������z���Ԝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highSC-003Suspicious CommandsMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Dynamic code execution via exec()

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule SC-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    5680:             // \S+ only matches non-whitespace, so trim() is technically unnecessary,
    5681:             // but we keep it for defensive coding and backward compatibility
>>> 5682:             const match = /^Bearer\s+(\S+)$/i.exec(authHeader);
    5683:             if (match) {
    5684:                 token = match[1].trim();
Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ����R�Z��b�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ������b�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �����7��ȥz�h�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ���墒#ځ䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �^���7��ȥz�h�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �^�墒#ځ䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �^����z����h�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��E�h�+h�$���

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �A��܄8�~Ĝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �L�W������v�'���Ĝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �L�W����"�.zĜ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki��y�^R�Z��b��^��'�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki�,�疊�K�yz֢�Ĝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki���z���Ԝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki���b�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki��y�-zd���

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki���#ځ䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: .+-����-zĜ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: .+-"�.x���Ĝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �Lz�E�z�Uz�"�t���

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: .+-5�����zĜ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: .+->�#y�LzfޮĜ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: 1��v�'R�hiԜ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �'����Zr��Ԝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: I�r^��"���zĜ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: R�Z����z����h�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: R�Z����z���Ԝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: R�Z�墒#ځ䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��׆��a@����

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��%��z�'v+�v�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �wb�'njYrv���S��l

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: i�^��݊����Mjg�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��%��z�'v+�v�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��%��z�'v+�v�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: }歺�������׬

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: i�^��݊����Mjg�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ����jn��E�[^��S��l

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ����jn��E�[^��S��l

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��׆��a@����

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ����R�Z��b�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: I�r^��"���zĜ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ������z���Ԝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��E�h�+h�$���

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �Lz�E�z�Uz�"�t���

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �A��܄8�~Ĝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: R�Z����z���Ԝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ������z����h�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �^����z����h�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: R�Z����z����h�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: .+-����-zĜ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: .+-"�.x���Ĝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: .+-5�����zĜ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: .+->�#y�LzfޮĜ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ���墒#ځ䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: R�Z�墒#ځ䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �^�墒#ځ䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ������b�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��zS��b�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �����7��ȥz�h�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �^���7��ȥz�h�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �L�W����"�.zĜ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �L�W������v�'���Ĝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: 1��v�'R�hiԜ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �'����Zr��Ԝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ���xI�nW�N�%��l

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ���x�݊����S��l

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ���xI�nW�N�%��l

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �wb�'njYrv���S��l

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ���x�݊����S��l

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: }歺�������׬

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ����ȭ���n��r�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ����,�玦ب�Ĝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki���z���Ԝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki�,�疊�K�yz֢�Ĝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki���z���Ԝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: =�"��^t8�r�,���E�)�{

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �+-"�.x8�r�,���

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: u�^����z�����ˬ�*'6�^

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki��ˬ�*'6�^

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��Z����z�����ˬ�*'6�^

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki��ˬ�*'6�^

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki��ˬ�*'6�^

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki��ˬ�*'6�^

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: r������z�����ˬ�*'6�^

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��Lz�E�z�M�׬

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki��y�^R�Z��b��^��'�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki��j�!E�)�{

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki���z���Ԝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki���z���Ԝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��Lz�E�z�C���

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki���z���Ԝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki���z���Ԝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��Lz�E�z�@��轩R��^

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki��ˬ�*'6�^

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki��ˬ�*'6�^

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: r������z������

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: r������z������

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: r������z������

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �+-1��y���-U�슉�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ���#Z��)iD�+-zw

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki���#ځ䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki���#ځ䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki���#ځ䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki���#ځ䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: .+->*^�)ް�m���

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki���b�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki���b�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki���b�����

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��O����w�������

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki���b�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki���b�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki���b�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �Qz�,��+�:�x�m���

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki��y�-zd���

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: yح>�#y�L�W����

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki���z���Ԝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ����ȭ���r����?

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ����ȭ���r����?

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: +Ki��Gh�u)���

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: v�'���E�^jǀ�ǭ

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: {%�ם)^=�mz��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: {%�ם)^=�mz��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: {%�ם)^=�mz��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: {%�ם)^=�mz��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��׆��a@����

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��E�h�+h�$���

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: �A��܄8�~Ĝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: I�r^��"���zĜ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ����R�Z��b�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ������z���Ԝ��

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: u�^����z�����ˬ�*'6�^

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ��Z����z�����ˬ�*'6�^

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: r������z�����ˬ�*'6�^

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
highDO-BASunknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Decoded base64 content: ������z����h�䜅�

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule DO-BAS) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
mediumEN-001unknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

High-entropy string (4.5 bits/char) — possible encoded payload

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule EN-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    435:         return;
    436:     try {
>>> 437:         const response = await fetch(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/user`, {
    438:             ...getFetchConfig(),
    439:             redirect: "follow",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    1553:         url.searchParams.append("namespace", namespace);
    1554:     }
>>> 1555:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    1556:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    1557:         method: "POST",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    1577:     const effectiveProjectId = getEffectiveProjectId(projectId);
    1578:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(effectiveProjectId)}/repository/branches`);
>>> 1579:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    1580:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    1581:         method: "POST",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    1599:     const effectiveProjectId = getEffectiveProjectId(projectId);
    1600:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(effectiveProjectId)}`);
>>> 1601:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    1602:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    1603:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    1625:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(effectiveProjectId)}/repository/files/${encodedPath}`);
    1626:     url.searchParams.append("ref", ref);
>>> 1627:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    1628:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    1629:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    1654:     const effectiveProjectId = getEffectiveProjectId(projectId);
    1655:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(effectiveProjectId)}/issues`);
>>> 1656:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    1657:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    1658:         method: "POST",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    1712:         }
    1713:     });
>>> 1714:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    1715:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    1716:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    1745:         }
    1746:     });
>>> 1747:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    1748:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    1749:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    1763:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId); // Decode project ID
    1764:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/issues/${issueIid}`);
>>> 1765:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    1766:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    1767:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    1787:         body.labels = body.labels.join(",");
    1788:     }
>>> 1789:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    1790:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    1791:         method: "PUT",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    1807:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId); // Decode project ID
    1808:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/issues/${issueIid}`);
>>> 1809:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    1810:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    1811:         method: "DELETE",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    1824:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId); // Decode project ID
    1825:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/issues/${issueIid}/links`);
>>> 1826:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    1827:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    1828:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    1843:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId); // Decode project ID
    1844:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/issues/${issueIid}/links/${issueLinkId}`);
>>> 1845:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    1846:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    1847:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    1865:     targetProjectId = decodeURIComponent(targetProjectId); // Decode target project ID as well
    1866:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/issues/${issueIid}/links`);
>>> 1867:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    1868:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    1869:         method: "POST",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    1890:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId); // Decode project ID
    1891:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/issues/${issueIid}/links/${issueLinkId}`);
>>> 1892:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    1893:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    1894:         method: "DELETE",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    1907:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId); // Decode project ID
    1908:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/merge_requests`);
>>> 1909:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    1910:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    1911:         method: "POST",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    1956:         url.searchParams.append("per_page", options.per_page.toString());
    1957:     }
>>> 1958:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    1959:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    1960:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2013:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId); // Decode project ID
    2014:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/merge_requests/${mergeRequestIid}/discussions/${discussionId}/notes/${noteId}`);
>>> 2015:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2016:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2017:         method: "DELETE",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2045:         payload.resolved = resolved;
    2046:     }
>>> 2047:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2048:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2049:         method: "PUT",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2091:         payload.resolved = resolved;
    2092:     }
>>> 2093:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2094:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2095:         method: "PUT",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2116:         payload.created_at = createdAt;
    2117:     }
>>> 2118:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2119:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2120:         method: "POST",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2143:         payload.created_at = createdAt;
    2144:     }
>>> 2145:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2146:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2147:         method: "POST",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2160:         body,
    2161:     };
>>> 2162:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2163:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2164:         method: "POST",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2172:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId); // Decode project ID
    2173:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/merge_requests/${mergeRequestIid}/notes/${noteId}`);
>>> 2174:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2175:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2176:         method: "DELETE",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2184:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId); // Decode project ID
    2185:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/merge_requests/${mergeRequestIid}/notes/${noteId}`);
>>> 2186:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2187:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2188:         method: "GET",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2207:         url.searchParams.append("page", page.toString());
    2208:     }
>>> 2209:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2210:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2211:         method: "GET",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2224:         body,
    2225:     };
>>> 2226:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2227:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2228:         method: "PUT",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2292:         }
    2293:     }
>>> 2294:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2295:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2296:         method,
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2319:         url.searchParams.append("ref", ref);
    2320:     }
>>> 2321:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2322:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2323:         method: "POST",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2354:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId); // Decode project ID
    2355:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/repository/commits`);
>>> 2356:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2357:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2358:         method: "POST",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2395:     url.searchParams.append("order_by", "id");
    2396:     url.searchParams.append("sort", "desc");
>>> 2397:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2398:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2399:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2422:  */
    2423: async function createRepository(options) {
>>> 2424:     const response = await fetch(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects`, {
    2425:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2426:         method: "POST",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2462:         throw new Error("Either mergeRequestIid or branchName must be provided");
    2463:     }
>>> 2464:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2465:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2466:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2496:         url.searchParams.append("view", view);
    2497:     }
>>> 2498:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2499:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2500:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2532:         url.searchParams.append("unidiff", "true");
    2533:     }
>>> 2534:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2535:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2536:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2555:         url.searchParams.append("straight", straight.toString());
    2556:     }
>>> 2557:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2558:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2559:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2585:     }
    2586:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/merge_requests/${mergeRequestIid}`);
>>> 2587:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2588:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2589:         method: "PUT",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2605:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId); // Decode project ID
    2606:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/merge_requests/${mergeRequestIid}/merge`);
>>> 2607:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2608:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2609:         method: "PUT",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2632:         body.approval_password = approvalPassword;
    2633:     }
>>> 2634:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2635:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2636:         method: "POST",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2650:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId);
    2651:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/merge_requests/${mergeRequestIid}/unapprove`);
>>> 2652:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2653:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2654:         method: "POST",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2668:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId);
    2669:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/merge_requests/${mergeRequestIid}/approval_state`);
>>> 2670:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2671:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2672:         method: "GET",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2692:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/${noteableType}s/${noteableIid}/notes` // Using plural form (issues/merge_requests) as per GitLab API documentation
    2693:     );
>>> 2694:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2695:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2696:         method: "POST",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2710:  */
    2711: async function getDraftNote(project_id, merge_request_iid, draft_note_id) {
>>> 2712:     const response = await fetch(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(project_id)}/merge_requests/${merge_request_iid}/draft_notes/${draft_note_id}`);
    2713:     if (!response.ok) {
    2714:         const errorText = await response.text();
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2721:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId);
    2722:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/merge_requests/${mergeRequestIid}/draft_notes`);
>>> 2723:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2724:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2725:         method: "GET",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2755:         requestBody.resolve_discussion = resolveDiscussion;
    2756:     }
>>> 2757:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2758:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2759:         method: "POST",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2790:         requestBody.resolve_discussion = resolveDiscussion;
    2791:     }
>>> 2792:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2793:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2794:         method: "PUT",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2812:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId);
    2813:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/merge_requests/${mergeRequestIid}/draft_notes/${draftNoteId}`);
>>> 2814:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2815:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2816:         method: "DELETE",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2831:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId);
    2832:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/merge_requests/${mergeRequestIid}/draft_notes/${draftNoteId}/publish`);
>>> 2833:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2834:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2835:         method: "PUT",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2883:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId);
    2884:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/merge_requests/${mergeRequestIid}/draft_notes/bulk_publish`);
>>> 2885:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2886:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2887:         method: "POST", // Changed from PUT to POST
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2915:         url.searchParams.append("resolved", resolved ? "true" : "false");
    2916:     }
>>> 2917:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2918:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2919:         method: "PUT",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2951:         payload.created_at = createdAt;
    2952:     }
>>> 2953:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2954:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2955:         method: "POST",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2971:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId); // Decode project ID
    2972:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/merge_requests/${mergeRequestIid}/versions`);
>>> 2973:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2974:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2975:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    2993:         url.searchParams.append("unidiff", String(unidiff));
    2994:     }
>>> 2995:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    2996:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    2997:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3021:         url.searchParams.append("top_level_only", "true");
    3022:     }
>>> 3023:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3024:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3025:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3037: async function getNamespace(id) {
    3038:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/namespaces/${encodeURIComponent(id)}`);
>>> 3039:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3040:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3041:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3057:         url.searchParams.append("parent_id", parentId.toString());
    3058:     }
>>> 3059:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3060:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3061:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3087:         url.searchParams.append("with_custom_attributes", "true");
    3088:     }
>>> 3089:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3090:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3091:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3115:     }
    3116:     // Make the API request
>>> 3117:     const response = await fetch(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects?${params.toString()}`, {
    3118:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3119:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3147:     });
    3148:     // Make the API request
>>> 3149:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3150:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3151:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3172:     }
    3173:     // Make the API request
>>> 3174:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3175:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3176:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3191:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId); // Decode project ID
    3192:     // Make the API request
>>> 3193:     const response = await fetch(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/labels`, {
    3194:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3195:         method: "POST",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3213:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId); // Decode project ID
    3214:     // Make the API request
>>> 3215:     const response = await fetch(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/labels/${encodeURIComponent(String(labelId))}`, {
    3216:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3217:         method: "PUT",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3233:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId); // Decode project ID
    3234:     // Make the API request
>>> 3235:     const response = await fetch(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/labels/${encodeURIComponent(String(labelId))}`, {
    3236:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3237:         method: "DELETE",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3281:     if (options.with_security_reports !== undefined)
    3282:         url.searchParams.append("with_security_reports", options.with_security_reports.toString());
>>> 3283:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3284:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3285:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3301:     if (options.with_content)
    3302:         url.searchParams.append("with_content", options.with_content.toString());
>>> 3303:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3304:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3305:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3313: async function getWikiPage(projectId, slug) {
    3314:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId); // Decode project ID
>>> 3315:     const response = await fetch(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/wikis/${encodeURIComponent(slug)}`, { ...getFetchConfig() });
    3316:     await handleGitLabError(response);
    3317:     const data = await response.json();
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3326:     if (format)
    3327:         body.format = format;
>>> 3328:     const response = await fetch(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/wikis`, {
    3329:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3330:         method: "POST",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3347:     if (format)
    3348:         body.format = format;
>>> 3349:     const response = await fetch(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/wikis/${encodeURIComponent(slug)}`, {
    3350:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3351:         method: "PUT",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3361: async function deleteWikiPage(projectId, slug) {
    3362:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId); // Decode project ID
>>> 3363:     const response = await fetch(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/wikis/${encodeURIComponent(slug)}`, {
    3364:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3365:         method: "DELETE",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3383:         }
    3384:     });
>>> 3385:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3386:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3387:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3400:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId); // Decode project ID
    3401:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/pipelines/${pipelineId}`);
>>> 3402:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3403:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3404:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3432:         }
    3433:     });
>>> 3434:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3435:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3436:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3464:         }
    3465:     });
>>> 3466:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3467:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3468:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3477:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId); // Decode project ID
    3478:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/jobs/${jobId}`);
>>> 3479:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3480:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3481:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3499:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId); // Decode project ID
    3500:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/jobs/${jobId}/trace`);
>>> 3501:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3502:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3503:         headers: {
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3549:         body.variables = variables;
    3550:     }
>>> 3551:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3552:         method: "POST",
    3553:         headers: {
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3571:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId); // Decode project ID
    3572:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/pipelines/${pipelineId}/retry`);
>>> 3573:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3574:         method: "POST",
    3575:         headers: {
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3592:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId); // Decode project ID
    3593:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/pipelines/${pipelineId}/cancel`);
>>> 3594:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3595:         method: "POST",
    3596:         headers: {
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3618:         body.job_variables_attributes = variables;
    3619:     }
>>> 3620:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3621:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3622:         method: "POST",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3637:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId);
    3638:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/jobs/${jobId}/retry`);
>>> 3639:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3640:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3641:         method: "POST",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3659:         url.searchParams.append("force", force.toString());
    3660:     }
>>> 3661:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3662:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3663:         method: "POST",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3692:         ...buildAuthHeaders(),
    3693:     };
>>> 3694:     const response = await fetch(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(options.project_id))}/repository/tree?${queryParams.toString()}`, {
    3695:         headers,
    3696:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3725:         }
    3726:     });
>>> 3727:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3728:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3729:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3741:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId);
    3742:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/milestones/${milestoneId}`);
>>> 3743:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3744:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3745:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3757:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId);
    3758:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/milestones`);
>>> 3759:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3760:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3761:         method: "POST",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3776:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId);
    3777:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/milestones/${milestoneId}`);
>>> 3778:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3779:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3780:         method: "PUT",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3794:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId);
    3795:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/milestones/${milestoneId}`);
>>> 3796:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3797:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3798:         method: "DELETE",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3809:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId);
    3810:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/milestones/${milestoneId}/issues`);
>>> 3811:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3812:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3813:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3825:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId);
    3826:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/milestones/${milestoneId}/merge_requests`);
>>> 3827:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3828:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3829:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3841:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId);
    3842:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/milestones/${milestoneId}/promote`);
>>> 3843:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3844:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3845:         method: "POST",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3858:     projectId = decodeURIComponent(projectId);
    3859:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(getEffectiveProjectId(projectId))}/milestones/${milestoneId}/burndown_events`);
>>> 3860:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3861:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3862:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3875:         const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/users`);
    3876:         url.searchParams.append("username", username);
>>> 3877:         const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3878:             ...getFetchConfig(),
    3879:         });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3953:     if (options.per_page)
    3954:         url.searchParams.append("per_page", options.per_page.toString());
>>> 3955:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3956:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3957:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    3975:         url.searchParams.append("stats", "true");
    3976:     }
>>> 3977:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    3978:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    3979:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    4001:             url.searchParams.append("page", page.toString());
    4002:         }
>>> 4003:         const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    4004:             ...getFetchConfig(),
    4005:         });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    4025:  */
    4026: async function getCurrentUser() {
>>> 4027:     const response = await fetch(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/user`, getFetchConfig());
    4028:     await handleGitLabError(response);
    4029:     const data = await response.json();
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    4089:     if (options.page)
    4090:         url.searchParams.append("page", options.page.toString());
>>> 4091:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), getFetchConfig());
    4092:     await handleGitLabError(response);
    4093:     const data = await response.json();
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    4123:     if (options.per_page)
    4124:         url.searchParams.append("per_page", options.per_page.toString());
>>> 4125:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), getFetchConfig());
    4126:     if (!response.ok) {
    4127:         await handleGitLabError(response);
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    4155:     });
    4156:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(effectiveProjectId)}/uploads`);
>>> 4157:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    4158:         method: "POST",
    4159:         headers: {
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    4188:     const effectiveProjectId = getEffectiveProjectId(projectId);
    4189:     const url = new URL(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(effectiveProjectId)}/uploads/${secret}/${filename}`);
>>> 4190:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    4191:         method: "GET",
    4192:         headers: {
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    4240:         }
    4241:     });
>>> 4242:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    4243:         method: "GET",
    4244:         headers: {
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    4268:         }
    4269:     });
>>> 4270:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    4271:         method: "GET",
    4272:         headers: {
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    4297:         }
    4298:     });
>>> 4299:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    4300:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    4301:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    4318:         url.searchParams.append("include_html_description", includeHtmlDescription.toString());
    4319:     }
>>> 4320:     const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    4321:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    4322:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    4334: async function createRelease(projectId, options) {
    4335:     const effectiveProjectId = getEffectiveProjectId(projectId);
>>> 4336:     const response = await fetch(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(effectiveProjectId)}/releases`, {
    4337:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    4338:         method: "POST",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    4353: async function updateRelease(projectId, tagName, options) {
    4354:     const effectiveProjectId = getEffectiveProjectId(projectId);
>>> 4355:     const response = await fetch(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(effectiveProjectId)}/releases/${encodeURIComponent(tagName)}`, {
    4356:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    4357:         method: "PUT",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    4371: async function deleteRelease(projectId, tagName) {
    4372:     const effectiveProjectId = getEffectiveProjectId(projectId);
>>> 4373:     const response = await fetch(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(effectiveProjectId)}/releases/${encodeURIComponent(tagName)}`, {
    4374:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    4375:         method: "DELETE",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    4387: async function createReleaseEvidence(projectId, tagName) {
    4388:     const effectiveProjectId = getEffectiveProjectId(projectId);
>>> 4389:     const response = await fetch(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(effectiveProjectId)}/releases/${encodeURIComponent(tagName)}/evidence`, {
    4390:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    4391:         method: "POST",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    4403: async function downloadReleaseAsset(projectId, tagName, directAssetPath) {
    4404:     const effectiveProjectId = getEffectiveProjectId(projectId);
>>> 4405:     const response = await fetch(`${getEffectiveApiUrl()}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(effectiveProjectId)}/releases/${encodeURIComponent(tagName)}/downloads/${directAssetPath}`, {
    4406:         ...getFetchConfig(),
    4407:     });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    4467:                 logger.info({ endpoint: graphqlUrl }, "execute_graphql request");
    4468:                 try {
>>> 4469:                     const response = await fetch(graphqlUrl, {
    4470:                         ...getFetchConfig(),
    4471:                         method: "POST",
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    4772:                     url.searchParams.append("owned", args.owned.toString());
    4773:                 }
>>> 4774:                 const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    4775:                     ...getFetchConfig(),
    4776:                 });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    4785:                 const args = GetNamespaceSchema.parse(params.arguments);
    4786:                 const url = new URL(`${GITLAB_API_URL}/namespaces/${encodeURIComponent(args.namespace_id)}`);
>>> 4787:                 const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    4788:                     ...getFetchConfig(),
    4789:                 });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    4798:                 const args = VerifyNamespaceSchema.parse(params.arguments);
    4799:                 const url = new URL(`${GITLAB_API_URL}/namespaces/${encodeURIComponent(args.path)}/exists`);
>>> 4800:                 const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    4801:                     ...getFetchConfig(),
    4802:                 });
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    4819:                 if (options.with_custom_attributes)
    4820:                     url.searchParams.append("with_custom_attributes", "true");
>>> 4821:                 const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    4822:                     ...getFetchConfig(),
    4823:                 });
Report false positive
mediumEN-001unknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

High-entropy string (4.5 bits/char) — possible encoded payload

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule EN-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
mediumEN-001unknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

High-entropy string (4.6 bits/char) — possible encoded payload

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule EN-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
mediumEN-001unknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

High-entropy string (4.7 bits/char) — possible encoded payload

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule EN-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
mediumEN-001unknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

High-entropy string (4.9 bits/char) — possible encoded payload

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule EN-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
mediumEN-001unknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

High-entropy string (4.9 bits/char) — possible encoded payload

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule EN-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
mediumEN-001unknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

High-entropy string (4.8 bits/char) — possible encoded payload

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule EN-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
mediumEN-001unknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

High-entropy string (5.0 bits/char) — possible encoded payload

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule EN-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
mediumEN-001unknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

High-entropy string (4.9 bits/char) — possible encoded payload

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule EN-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
mediumEN-001unknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

High-entropy string (4.7 bits/char) — possible encoded payload

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule EN-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    123:             params.append("client_secret", this.config.clientSecret);
    124:         }
>>> 125:         const response = await fetch(tokenUrl, {
    126:             method: "POST",
    127:             headers: {
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    158:             params.append("client_secret", this.config.clientSecret);
    159:         }
>>> 160:         const response = await fetch(tokenUrl, {
    161:             method: "POST",
    162:             headers: {
Report false positive
mediumNS-001Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Python requests library HTTP call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    254:             requestIdToOAuthInstance.set(initialRequestId, this);
    255:             const timeout = setTimeout(() => {
>>> 256:                 pendingAuthRequests.get(initialRequestId)?.reject(new Error("OAuth flow timed out"));
    257:                 pendingAuthRequests.delete(initialRequestId);
    258:             }, 5 * 60 * 1000);
Report false positive
mediumNS-001Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Python requests library HTTP call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    323:                             const reqId = stateToRequestId.get(returnedState);
    324:                             if (reqId) {
>>> 325:                                 const pending = pendingAuthRequests.get(reqId);
    326:                                 if (pending) {
    327:                                     clearTimeout(pending.timeout);
Report false positive
mediumNS-001Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Python requests library HTTP call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    370:                 </html>
    371:               `);
>>> 372:                             const pending = pendingAuthRequests.get(reqId);
    373:                             if (pending) {
    374:                                 clearTimeout(pending.timeout);
Report false positive
mediumNS-001Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Python requests library HTTP call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    391:                 </html>
    392:               `);
>>> 393:                             const pending = pendingAuthRequests.get(reqId);
    394:                             if (pending) {
    395:                                 clearTimeout(pending.timeout);
Report false positive
mediumNS-001Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Python requests library HTTP call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    411:                 </html>
    412:               `);
>>> 413:                             const pending = pendingAuthRequests.get(reqId);
    414:                             if (pending) {
    415:                                 clearTimeout(pending.timeout);
Report false positive
mediumNS-001Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Python requests library HTTP call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    442:             server.on("error", error => {
    443:                 logger.error("OAuth server error:", error);
>>> 444:                 const pending = pendingAuthRequests.get(initialRequestId);
    445:                 if (pending) {
    446:                     clearTimeout(pending.timeout);
Report false positive
mediumEN-001unknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

High-entropy string (4.7 bits/char) — possible encoded payload

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule EN-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    14:         // Using plural form "issues" in the URL
    15:         const url = new URL(`${GITLAB_API_URL}/api/v4/projects/${encodeURIComponent(PROJECT_ID)}/issues/${ISSUE_IID}/notes`);
>>> 16:         const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    17:             method: "POST",
    18:             headers: {
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    18:     try {
    19:         const url = new URL(`${GITLAB_API_URL}/api/v4/projects/${encodeURIComponent(PROJECT_ID)}/issues/${ISSUE_IID}/discussions/${DISCUSSION_ID}/notes/${NOTE_ID}`);
>>> 20:         const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    21:             method: "PUT",
    22:             headers: {
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    47:     try {
    48:         const url = new URL(`${GITLAB_API_URL}/api/v4/projects/${encodeURIComponent(PROJECT_ID)}/issues/${ISSUE_IID}/discussions/${DISCUSSION_ID}/notes/${NOTE_ID}`);
>>> 49:         const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    50:             method: "PUT",
    51:             headers: {
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    76:     try {
    77:         const url = new URL(`${GITLAB_API_URL}/api/v4/projects/${encodeURIComponent(PROJECT_ID)}/issues/${ISSUE_IID}/discussions/${DISCUSSION_ID}/notes/${NOTE_ID}`);
>>> 78:         const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
    79:             method: "PUT",
    80:             headers: {
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    262:         await client2.listTools();
    263:         // Check metrics
>>> 264:         const response = await fetch(metricsUrl);
    265:         assert.ok(response.ok, 'Metrics endpoint should be accessible');
    266:         const metrics = await response.json();
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    275:     test('should reuse connections for same API URL', async () => {
    276:         // Get initial metrics
>>> 277:         const response1 = await fetch(metricsUrl);
    278:         const metrics1 = await response1.json();
    279:         const initialSize = metrics1.gitlabClientPool?.size || 0;
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    290:         }
    291:         // Check metrics - should not have created 3 new pool entries
>>> 292:         const response2 = await fetch(metricsUrl);
    293:         const metrics2 = await response2.json();
    294:         const finalSize = metrics2.gitlabClientPool?.size || 0;
Report false positive
mediumEN-001unknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

High-entropy string (4.6 bits/char) — possible encoded payload

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule EN-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
mediumEN-001unknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

High-entropy string (4.6 bits/char) — possible encoded payload

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule EN-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
mediumEN-001unknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

High-entropy string (4.6 bits/char) — possible encoded payload

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule EN-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
mediumEN-001unknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

High-entropy string (4.6 bits/char) — possible encoded payload

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule EN-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    185:         // Step 3: Try to make request WITHOUT auth header - should fail with 401
    186:         try {
>>> 187:             const response = await fetch(mcpUrl, {
    188:                 method: 'POST',
    189:                 headers: {
Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    44:  */
    45: async function sendMCPRequest(url, method, headers = {}) {
>>> 46:     const response = await fetch(url, {
    47:         method: 'POST',
    48:         headers: {
Report false positive
mediumEN-001unknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

High-entropy string (4.6 bits/char) — possible encoded payload

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule EN-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
mediumEN-001unknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

High-entropy string (4.5 bits/char) — possible encoded payload

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule EN-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
mediumEN-001unknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

High-entropy string (4.5 bits/char) — possible encoded payload

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule EN-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    218:     });
    219:     test('should return 405 for GET /mcp', async () => {
>>> 220:         const response = await fetch(`http://${HOST}:${port}/mcp`);
    221:         assert.strictEqual(response.status, 405, 'GET /mcp should respond with 405');
    222:         const body = await response.json();
Report false positive
mediumEN-001unknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

High-entropy string (4.6 bits/char) — possible encoded payload

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule EN-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
mediumEN-001unknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

High-entropy string (4.5 bits/char) — possible encoded payload

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule EN-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
mediumEN-001unknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

High-entropy string (4.7 bits/char) — possible encoded payload

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule EN-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
mediumEN-001unknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

High-entropy string (4.6 bits/char) — possible encoded payload

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule EN-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
mediumOB-001ObfuscationMedium ConfidenceLine 0

Possible Base64-encoded payload (long encoded string)

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule OB-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    8: const TEST_SECRET = 'testsecret123';
    9: // Minimum valid 1x1 transparent PNG
>>> 10: const MINIMAL_PNG_BUF = Buffer.from('iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAYAAAAfFcSJAAAADUlEQVR42mNk+M9QDwADhgGAWjR9awAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==', 'base64');
    11: // Unique suffix per test run to avoid conflicts on concurrent executions
    12: const RUN_ID = Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8);
Report false positive
mediumEN-001unknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

High-entropy string (4.7 bits/char) — possible encoded payload

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule EN-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
mediumEN-001unknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

High-entropy string (4.7 bits/char) — possible encoded payload

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule EN-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
mediumEN-001unknownMedium ConfidenceLine 0

High-entropy string (4.6 bits/char) — possible encoded payload

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule EN-001) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

Report false positive
mediumNS-003Network SuspiciousMedium ConfidenceLine 0

JavaScript fetch() call

Detected by automated pattern matching (rule NS-003) with medium confidence. May be a false positive.

    199:         try {
    200:             const controller = createTimeoutController(5000);
>>> 201:             const response = await fetch(`http://${HOST}:${port}/health`, {
    202:                 method: 'GET',
    203:                 signal: controller.signal
Report false positive

Scan History

DateRiskFindings
Feb 25, 2026critical459
Feb 23, 2026critical459
Feb 22, 2026critical459